The Use of Flexible Working Contracts in West Germany: Evidence from an Establishment Panel by Boockmann, Bernhard & Hagen, Tobias
Non-technical summary
There has been much discussion in Germany whether flexible forms of employ-
ment should be facilitated in order to reduce rigidities on the labour market. Flexi-
ble labour contracts, such as fixed-term contracts (FTCs), temporary work agency
(TWA) employment and freelance work (FL) are, on the one hand, seen as im-
portant instruments of adjustment for employers. On the other, they may create a
segmented labour market, with part of the workforce being permanently employed
in unstable and precarious employment relationships. In West Germany, the share
of TWA workers has increased strongly over the last decades. The share of FTC
workers has risen, too, although to a somewhat more moderate extent. Some, but
certainly not all of this development can be attributed to changes in the law.
 This paper investigates under which conditions firms employ FTC, TWA or FL
workers. The need to use flexible labour contracts arises from the adjustment costs
for permanent workers. From the theory of dynamic labour demand, conditions
may be derived under which atypical work is a more efficient instrument of ad-
justment to temporary demand fluctuations than adjustments in the number of
regular employees. In addition, by employing atypical workers firms may insulate
their regular workforce from changing demand conditions and can therefore re-
duce firing costs and preserve firm-specific human capital. Using the IAB-
establishment panel for West-Germany and a probit model which accounts for
firm heterogeneity, we find that positive changes in expected or actual sales are
associated with a higher probability of employing atypical work, which suggests
that these forms of employment are used as means of adjustment.
Institutionally, adjustment costs for permanent workers are mainly due to indi-
vidual and collective dismissal protection and the requirements of German co-
determination law. One object of the paper is to assess whether these regulations
have an impact on firms’ employment decisions. Concerning co-determination,
one might argue that the presence of works councils, by making separations more
costly, increases the demand for atypical work. In our estimations, this hypothesis
is strongly confirmed for FTC employment, although not for TWA or FL workers.
Concerning dismissal protection, firms which are too small to be covered by the
law should have a lower incentive to use atypical work. In our data set, we have
exogenous variation in the minimum number of employees beyond which the
dismissal protection law applies. Using this as a source for a natural experiment,
we do find that the likelihood of using FTCs decreased for firms which ceased to
be covered by the law. Hence, we conclude that legal dismissal protection for
regular employees has an impact on the demand for workers on fixed-term con-
tracts.
In our estimations, we control for a number of other factors, such as employees’
skill levels. Descriptive evidence shows that, on average, FTC and TWA workers
possess lower skills than permanent workers. However, the proportion of employ-
ees with university education is also high among FTC workers. We further include
measures for the kind of investments undertaken and the incidence of specific per-
sonnel problems. A set of industry dummies confirms the notion that FTC and, to
an even higher extent, TWA work is concentrated in particular industries.
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11 Introduction
There has been much discussion in Germany whether flexible forms of employ-
ment (often also called secondary, contingent or atypical employment1) should be
facilitated in order to reduce rigidities on the labour market. Flexible labour con-
tracts, such as fixed-term contracts (FTC), temporary work agency (TWA) em-
ployment, freelance work (FL) or marginal part-time work are, on the one hand,
seen as important instruments of adjustment for employers. On the other, they may
create a segmented labour market, with part of the workforce being permanently
employed in unstable and precarious employment relationships. Recent changes in
the regulation of atypical employment in Germany have gone both ways. There
has been a stepwise deregulation of TWA and FTC employment since the mid-
1980s which was, however, partially reversed in the case of FTCs by the new
German government after 1998. Likewise, regulations on marginal part-time work
and freelance work were tightened in 1999, extending the coverage of the social
security system to these workers.
In this paper we will focus on the decision of West German firms to use FTC,
TWA and FL employment. In the literature, several reasons have been identified
that may render atypical employment profitable. First, the most commonly cited
reason is that firms can use atypical employment to adjust more efficiently to tem-
porary demand fluctuations. In particular, if employers are uncertain about
whether a rise in demand is temporary or permanent, they will be reluctant to in-
crease the number of regular workers, relying instead on atypical workers until the
economic outlook becomes more certain. Second, by employing atypical work,
firms may insulate their regular workforce from changing demand conditions.
This insulation may help firms to reduce firing costs and save firm-specific human
capital. It may also be used to obtain wage and work rule concessions from regular
workers in exchange for greater employment security. Third, atypical work may
be used in case of temporary absences of regular employees due to illness, holi-
days or child care leave.  Fourth, firms may use flexible working contracts to
screen prospective regular employees.2 Fifth, the existence of specialised TWA or
FL workers may make it cost-effective for small- or medium-sized firms to hire
                                             
1 For a definition of flexible work see POLIVKA and NARDONE (1989), ATKINSON (1985) or
KELLER and SEIFERT (1995). A definition of TWA employment can be found in BROSE et al.
(1990). The distinction between FL and other self-employed workers, on the one hand, and de-
pendent employment, on the other, is discussed in DIETRICH (1999). 
2 POLIVKA and NARDONE (1989) report that temporary work agencies in the US charge a penalty
when subcontracted workers are retained permanently by the user enterprise. This shows that
screening may be an important reason for using temporary employment.
2atypical workers for particular tasks instead of hiring regular workers. ABRAHAM
and TAYLOR (1996) cite the example of computer support activities inside smaller
firms often being carried out by FL workers. Sixth, employers may be forced to
use secondary workers if they are not able to fill vacancies at prevailing wages.
An explanation for skill shortage as a reason for atypical employment is not easily
found since one common assumption in theoretical models is that atypical em-
ployees are worse off than regular employees. Nevertheless, firms report to be
using TWA or FL workers in case of skill shortage even if the unfilled vacancies
are for employees with a university degree.3 And finally, using FL workers instead
of permanent employees may be advantageous for firms in order to avoid paying
social security contributions. 
In our empirical analysis we will focus on the first three points mentioned which
we consider the most important ones. Some of these reasons are based on the
presence of wage rigidities for permanent workers. If wages of permanent workers
were perfectly flexible, firms would be able to adjust to economic fluctuations by
changing wages rather than by hiring and firing permanent or atypical workers. 
Efforts to build theoretical models of demand for atypical work start from the
theory of dual labour markets and the theory of dynamic labour demand.4 A com-
mon result of these models is that the two types of contracts (high versus low fir-
ing costs) increase the relative protection of regular employees and generate a du-
ality within firms.5 Since hiring and firing of regular workers is costly due to eco-
nomic reasons (search, training etc.) as well as institutional reasons (protection
against dismissals etc.), hiring secondary workers with lower firing costs can be
advantageous for firms, even if regular (or primary) and atypical (or secondary)
workers are homogeneous and secondary workers have a higher wage rate (or
lower productivity) than primary workers.6 In the model of SAINT-PAUL (1996),
the primary or core workforce is insulated from demand fluctuations by secondary
workers, i.e. the job stability of regular workers increases. A sufficient increase in
product demand is a reason for employing secondary workers. Similarly, the theo-
retical model of ABRAHAM (1988) shows that an increase in the dispersion (un
                                             
3 For instance, in the IAB-Establishment Panel 2000 for the federal state of Baden-Württemberg,
13 per cent of the establishments which reported skill shortages used TWA workers to deal with
this problem. 
4 See BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1992) and SAINT-PAUL (1996). For a review of evidence of
existence of dual or segmented labour markets see DICKENS and LANG (1992). 
5 For a contrary result see MAURIN (2000). 
6 Usually, higher wage rates are motivated  by higher supervision costs of secondary workers.
They occur since they are less experienced than regular employees and shirk with a higher prob-
ability because they are less motivated (SAINT-PAUL 1996, ABRAHAM 1988). 
3certainty) of demand raises the expected ratio of secondary to regular employ-
ment. 
Empirical evidence concerning the reasons for firms employing atypical workers
is scarce. The empirical analysis of ABRAHAM (1988), based on a survey of U.S.
employers in 1985, shows that firms subject to high seasonal or year-to-year
variations in demand make greater use of temporary workers than other firms.
ABRAHAM and TAYLOR (1996) find that, for the U.S., a firm’s decision to use
contracted work rather than its own employees is influenced by wage and benefit
savings, the volatility of its output demand, and the availability of specialised
skills possessed by FL workers. If FL work is employed in low-skilled activities,
the decision is motivated mainly by savings in wage costs. Tasks in machine
maintenance, engineering and drafting, accounting or computer services are con-
tracted out more frequently in smaller establishments and in locations within met-
ropolitan areas. 
AUTOR (2000) assesses empirically whether there is a causal relation between
the increase of firing costs (decline of “employment-at-will”7) in some federal
states in the U.S. and the growth of TWA employment. The empirical analysis
indicates that the increase in firing costs explains as much as 20 percent of the
growth of TWA employment between 1973 and 1995. 
Using a dataset with German firms from the service sector, KAISER and
PFEIFFER (2000) investigate under which conditions firms use FTC and FL em-
ployment as a means of adjustment. The probability of using FTC employment
increases with the size of the firm, the significance of demand changes and the
share of low skilled workers. Furthermore, if a firm is bound to a collective wage
agreement, the probability of using FTC workers increases as well. Contrary to
these results, FL work is used with a lower intensity if the firm applies a collective
wage agreement, and increases with the share of high-skilled workers. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section de-
scribes dismissal protection legislation and the regulation of atypical employment
in Germany. Section 3 presents some stylised facts. Section 4 refers to the dy-
namic theory of labour demand to discuss the conditions under which atypical
employment is used  in order to cope with demand and supply changes. Section 5
introduces the data set and describes the specification. Section 6 contains the em-
pirical results. Section 7 concludes.       
                                             
7 The common law doctrine of employment-at-will, which has been recognized throughout the
U.S. since 1953, held that employers and employees have unlimited discretion to terminate their
employment relationships at any time for any reason unless explicitly contracted otherwise
(AUTOR 2000). 
42 Institutional Background
In order to explain the use of flexible working contracts, one has to consider the
institutional factors which raise the adjustment costs of regular employment. In
Germany, these are primarily the legal protection against dismissal, the employ-
ment protection regulations contained in collective agreements and the role of the
works councils.  
German dismissal protection is based on legal regulations as well as decisions
of labour courts. Furthermore, collective agreements sometimes contain additional
clauses in favour of employees. These regulations makes individual or collective
dismissals costly either in terms of time, money or procedural complexity (HUNT
2000). Dismissals are associated with periods of notice which depend on age and
job tenure. In the absence of individual or collective agreements, the notice period
is one month for two years of job tenure and increases up to 20 months for 20
years of job tenure (§ 622 of the German Civil Code, BGB). In addition, the Pro-
tection Against Dismissal Law (KSchG) stipulates conditions under which a dis-
missal is socially unjustified. A worker who has been dismissed unfairly is entitled
to severance payments. These depend on age, job tenure and earnings and amount
to a maximum of 12 monthly wages (§ 10 KSchG) or up to 18 monthly wages if
the dismissed employee is at least 55 years old and has been employed in the firm
at least for 20 years.    
Before the changes introduced by the second Improvement of Employment Op-
portunity Act (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz, BeschFG) in October 1996, all
permanent employees with a duration of employment of at least 6 months in es-
tablishments with 6 or more employees covered by social security (threshold
level) were within the scope of the dismissal protection law. The new Improve-
ment of Employment Opportunities Act of 1996 raised the threshold level for the
application of the dismissal protection law to 11 employees. However, employees
which had been covered by the dismissal protection law in September 1996 re-
tained their coverage under the old regulation for three years (until September
1999). In December 1998, the new German government lowered the threshold
level to 6 employees. Since our dataset extends over most of the 1990s, we have
exogenous variation (“natural experiment”) in dismissal protection legislation
which will allow us to assess the effect of employment protection on the use of
flexible working contracts. 
According to the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, BetrVG),
the works council (Betriebsrat) must be consulted before an employee can be laid
5off. Works councils are elected every 4 years in establishments employing more
than 5 workers. If the works council disagrees, the worker may appeal to the la-
bour court. In case of mass dismissal the consultation with the works council is
more extensive and the regional employment office (Landesarbeitsamt) must be
informed. The employment office can decide that the employer has to wait for up
to 2 months (normally 1 month) before proceeding with redundancies. Firms with
at least 20 employees have to negotiate a “social plan” with the works council,
which includes redundancy payment and payment of re-training measures. 
In establishments with at least 20 employees, works councils also have to agree
to the recruitment of new employees (§ 99 BetrVG). The works council can refuse
to agree if the recruitment leads to dismissals or is otherwise detrimental for the
current staff. In this case, the employer can appeal to a labour court for an ap-
proval of the recruitment. Thus, although works councils cannot ultimately pre-
vent the employer from hiring new workers, they can increase the procedural
complexities and the costs of hiring. Apart from these general provisions, the
Works Constitution Act does not provide works councils with a mandate to nego-
tiate with employers over the use of atypical employment.
The most important restrictions on the use of atypical employment are the “ob-
jective reasons” which must be given for FTC employment, the maximum number
of successive TWA employment contracts or the maximum number of renewals of
FTCs, and finally, the maximum cumulated duration of these contracts with one
employer.  
The use of FTCs was liberalised by the Improvement of Employment Opportu-
nities Act in May 1985. Before this act came into force, German employers al-
ways had to justify the use of FTCs by “objective reasons”. From 1985, employers
were free to hire new employees on FTCs without “objective reasons” for a dura-
tion of up to 18 months. In start-up businesses, the maximum duration was ex-
tended to 24 months. However, under the Act an FTC had to be converted into a
permanent contract if, on expiry of the contract, the worker was to be retained. To
prevent the opposite conversion from permanent into temporary employment con-
tracts, FTCs were not permitted if the worker had been employed by the same em-
ployer (on either type of contract) during a period of four months before conclu-
sion of the FTC. 
Even before 1985, FTCs with a maximum duration of 6 months had been possi-
ble in accordance with the Civil Code (“Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch”, BGB), but
again there was the judicial requirement that a reason must be given for conclu-
sion of an FTC. Accepted reasons were (and still are) seasonal fluctuations, tem
6porarily high volumes of work, deputising a person, carrying out special tasks, on-
the-job-training, public employment measures and probationary periods. 
When the second Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act came into
force in October 1996, the maximum duration of FTCs was extended to 24
months, and a maximum of three contract renewals were allowed. In January
2001, a new law of part-time and fixed-term employment relationship (“Gesetz
über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge”) came into effect which re-
placed the Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act. Fixed-term contracts
without objective reasons are now only allowed in case of hiring new employees
(i.e. employees who have never before worked for the employer). The law explic-
itly states that the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts and the number of
renewals can be regulated by collective agreements, even in the case they should
be less restrictive than the law. Fixed-term contracts, however, have so far  not
been subject to collective bargaining.
Until 1967, the supply of temporary workers by TWA was forbidden, because
the Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) had a monopoly on
job placement. In 1967 a judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court repealed
this regulation in view of the constitutional right of freedom of occupation. The
supply of workers by private agencies was subsequently regulated by the Tempo-
rary Employment Agencies Act (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz, AÜG) of 1972.
The main thrust of the law is still valid today: the TWA has all the duties of an
employer. With this provision, the legislator aimed at bringing the relation be-
tween the TWA and its temporary workers onto the same level as the relation be-
tween a regular employer and its employee.
To prevent the TWA from working as a job placement agency, additional condi-
tions were included in the law. First, the employment contract between the TWA
and the temporary worker has to be of unlimited duration. This stipulation was
later given more concrete meaning by the Federal Employment Service. It re-
quired the contract between the worker and the TWA to be at least 25 per cent or
one day longer than the duration of the first commission to a user enterprise. A
second legal condition for TWAs is the limit to the duration a worker is allowed to
be commissioned to a user company. In the original law, the maximum duration
had been 3 months. With the Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act of
1985, the maximum duration was extended to 6 months. In 1994, this limitation
was increased to 9 months. In addition, the Federal Employment Service’s mo-
nopoly of job placement was repealed in this year. Since then, TWAs have had the
possibility both to supply temporary workers and to provide job placement serv
7ices. Finally, the maximum cumulated duration was increased to 12 months by the
Temporary Employment Agencies Act of 1997. The works council of the user es-
tablishment has to agree to the employment of TWA workers (§ 14 AÜG) in the
same way as in the case of recruitment of permanent workers (§ 99 BetrVG). 
Following an intense public discussion on the subject of ficticious self-
employment (or “Scheinselbständigkeit”, such that the self-employed person
works for a major client without having access to the benefits of dependent em-
ployment), contracting FL workers was restricted in 1999. Self-employment is
usually regarded as ficticious if this form of employment primarily serves to re-
duce social security contributions. To limit the tendency of wage workers to be-
come ficticiously self-employed, the German government imposed more stringent
requirements on the classification of workers as self-employed. According to the
new regulations laid down in Vol. IV, § 7 of the German Social Welfare Code
(Sozialgesetzbuch), a person counts as an employee if at least three of the follow-
ing five conditions are fulfilled: (1) The person does not employ other workers;
(2) the person depends strongly on one employer over a long period of time; (3)
the person carries out tasks for which the employer usually employs permanent
workers; (4) the person does not act as an entrepreneur; (5) the person is employed
with the same tasks by the same employer for whom she previously worked as a
permanent employee. Since, we observe FL workers only until 1998 in our data,
we cannot analyse the effect of these new regulations.
3 Some stylised  facts on atypical employment in Germany
This section presents stylised facts on the development and structure of atypical
employment in Germany. For reasons of data availability, we will mainly be
looking at the stock of atypical workers recorded on a reference day, rather than
on the total number of employment contracts in force during a particular interval.
The stock of workers depends on the number of contracts as well as on their dura-
tion. 
Judged by figure 1, the share of FTC workers has remained fairly constant over
most of the last 15 years, staying in the 5 to 6 per cent interval up to 1997. Over-
all, FTC employment does not seem to evolve more cyclically than total employ-
ment. However, there was a decline to 5.0 percent after the post-unification boom
ended in 1993, and a subsequent increase in the proportion of FTC workers
reaching up to 7.1 per cent in 1999.
8Figure 1: Share of FTC Workers in West Germany
Note: Measured as of April of each year. Includes only blue-collar and white-
collar workers without persons in vocational training. 
Sources: German Microcensus, RUDOLPH (1996), RUDOLPH (2000). 
By comparison, figure 2 shows that TWA employment increased much more
dramatically over the last 15 to 20 years. In West Germany, the absolute number
of TWA workers rose by 683 per cent over the period from 1983 to 1995, with the
share of TWA workers in all employees covered by social security increasing to
0.75 per cent. In all Germany, the increase in the proportion of TWA workers ac-
celerated during the second half of the 1990s. In general, TWA employment
shows a markedly procyclical pattern, with the proportion of TWA workers ex-
hibiting strong growth after each of the recessions in 1975, 1982 and 1993. 
Data on FL workers are more difficult to obtain than for the other two forms of
employment. Based on projections from the IAB Establishment Panel, DIETRICH
(1999) reports that FL employment rose from 554,100 in 1994 to 610,500 in 1997.
Thus, there seems to have been an increase in the number of FL workers, too, al-
though perhaps a more moderate one than for TWA workers.
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9Figure 2: Share of TWA Workers in Overall Employment in West Germany
(all Germany after 1995)
Notes: Employment stocks (thousands) covered by social security at the end of June. Data
for West Germany are unavailable for years later than 1995. 
Sources: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
The skill composition of atypical workers differs from that of regular workers in
a number of ways. Table 1 summarises information from the German Microcensus
provided by the Federal Statistical Office as well as from the employment statis-
tics provided by the Federal Employment Office. The first source refers to all
blue- and white collar workers, while the latter contains only employees covered
by the social security system. Therefore, the numbers are not directly comparable.
In both cases, information is given for West Germany only and limited to the pri-
vate sector. Among FTC workers, we find a higher share of employees without
vocational qualification than among workers with a permanent contract. However,
the proportion of employees with university education is also higher among FTC
workers. This still holds even though the academic sector, in which the use of FTC
contracts is particularly wide-spread, is excluded from the statistics. We did not
find any apparent differences between the skill composition of female and male
FTC workers. Overall, the share of female FTC workers is only slightly above the
share of male FTC workers (4.6 per cent for women as opposed to 4.4 per cent for
men).
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Table 1: Skill Composition of FTC and TWA Workers in West Germany (percentages) 
Blue-collar and white-collar
workers, 1997
Workers covered by social
security, 1998
FTC workers Permanent
workers
Workers em-
ployed in the
TWA industry
All workers
No Vocational Qualification 23.1 18.1 36.0 20.5
Vocational Training 59.5 71.3 60.5 71.5
University or College Degree 17.4 10.6 3.5 8.1
Notes: Private sector only. FTC workers do not include employees in vocational training. Work-
ers with A-levels (Abitur) but no vocational training are included in the middle category. 
Sources: FTC workers: German Microcensus 1997, Federal Statistical Office. TWA workers:
Employment Statistic 1998, Federal Employment Office.
  
TWA workers are identified by their employer’s industry affiliation. If the em-
ployer belongs to the temporary work agencies industry (code: 745), his or her
employees are counted among TWA workers. Since we cannot distinguish be-
tween TWA workers and TWA agencies’ regular administrative staff, the propor-
tions may be slightly biased. There is clear evidence, however, that TWA workers
possess, on average, lower skills than permanent workers. The share of women
among TWA workers is fairly constant over time and amounts to about 20 per
cent (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2000). 
Comparable data for the skill composition of FL workers are not available.
However, the German Microcensus does contain information on self-employed
persons who do not themselves employ other workers. For 1997, we found that the
average skill level in this group is higher than among blue-collar or white-collar
dependent workers. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with care since
many persons in this category cannot be counted as FL workers.
The duration of FTCs and TWA contracts in West Germany is described in ta-
bles A1 and A2 of the appendix. Again, care must be exercised in interpreting
these numbers. Information concerning the duration of FTCs is taken from stock
data, i.e. the number of contracts in force at a particular moment in time. Com-
pared to the total number of contracts concluded during a particular time span, the
number of contracts with short duration is under-sampled in stock data. Even tak-
ing into account the length-bias (SALANT, 1977), temporary contracts with a dura-
tion of more than 12 months are no rare phenomena in West Germany. There are
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some differences regarding contract duration between young and old employees as
well as between unskilled and skilled workers. 
While no information is available on the duration of TWA employment spells
within the user enterprise, there is data on the duration of the employment rela-
tionship of temporary workers with their TWA (see table A2 in the appendix). The
duration of employment within the commissioning firm can be interpreted as an
upper limit to the time a worker is commissioned to a user enterprise. Employment
relationships of temporary workers with TWAs appear to be often very short-term.
In 1998, 64.3 percent of all terminated relationships were shorter than three
months. In spite of the increase of the maximum duration a worker can be com-
missioned to a user enterprise in 1994, the length of employment of temporary
workers provided by TWAs seems to decline. The short average duration of TWA
employment in combination with high and increasing stocks of TWA workers im-
plies a large and increasing number of inflows and outflows. 
So far, we have looked at atypical work from the perspective of the worker. Ta-
ble 2 displays the proportions of firms using atypical workers. It is based on the
Establishment Panel of the IAB, the same data source which is also used in our
econometric investigation. From the table, we observe an increase in the share of
establishments using atypical work for all types of flexible contracts from 1996 to
1998. The increase in the use of FTC workers could be due to the effect of the new
Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act of 1996. However, the increase is
even stronger in proportional terms for the other two types of contracts, though no
changes in the regulation of these employment relationships occurred in 1996. 
Table 2: Share of Establishments Using Flexible Working Contracts (Percentages)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
FTC workers 6.7 7.8 8.4 7.6
TWA workers 2.1 2.3 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.1
FL workers 4.4 4.8 3.6 4.4 4.7 4.4
Notes: Weighted and extrapolated data for West Germany. As in the estimation sample,
establishments which did not report their turnover as revenues (financial institutions, in-
surance companies, non-profit organisations, the government sector, public social secu-
rity institutions and agricultural enterprises) were excluded.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel waves 2 - 6 for West Germany.
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The weak increase in the share of firms using TWA employment is unexpected,
given the strong rise in the number of TWA workers during this period (see figure
2). Moreover, the decrease in the use of TWA labour after 1995 is surprising,
given the liberalisation of the Temporary Employment Agencies Law in 1994 and
the strong increase in the share of TWA workers during this period (see figure 2).
Apparently, the rise in the number of TWA workers is due to increased demand by
firms already employing this kind of workers, not by an increase in numbers of
these firms.
A breakdown of firms using atypical work by establishment size and by industry
is provided in table A3 in the appendix. As expected, the proportion of establish-
ments employing atypical workers increases with the total number of employees.
However, the size effect is stronger for FTC and TWA employees than for FL
work. The reason could be that small and medium-sized firms use FL workers for
very specialised tasks of intermittent nature for which hiring regular or temporary
employees does not pay. The table also shows that TWA employment is used pre-
dominantly in the supply of energy and water, as well as in basic and investment
goods industries. FTCs are frequent in the same industries, but also in some of the
service sectors. FL work, by contrast, is concentrated in industries which are pro-
viding human capital intensive services, such as education and business related
services.
The role of flexible working contracts can also be gathered from assessments of
the establishments‘ management. In the 1996 survey of the IAB Establishment
Panel, establishments were asked whether they had experienced expected or unex-
pected fluctuations in demand and production during the year and which instru-
ments of adjustment they had used. The results can be seen from table A4 in the
appendix. FTCs are much more frequently mentioned than TWA employment, in
particular among companies affected by expected demand changes. Only three per
cent of these companies used TWA employment as a means of adjustment, while
TWAs were used by six per cent of the establishments affected by unforeseen de-
mand changes. This difference can be explained by lower search costs, but higher
overall labour costs for TWA workers in comparison to FTC workers. A firm
which needs to react quickly to an unexpected positive shock in the very short run
may have no time to search for new employees on the labour market, while a firm
which has more time for adjustment may engage in search activities in order to
avoid TWA charges.
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4 Atypical work as a means of adjustment
If the wages of permanent workers were perfectly flexible, quantitative adjust-
ments in firms’ workforces, such as the employment of atypical workers, would
not be necessary as a response to changing demand and supply conditions. In real-
ity, wage rigidities are prevalent in Germany, as a number of studies confirm
(FITZENBERGER and FRANZ, 2000). One explanation for wage rigidities at the firm
level is the presence of industry-wide collective agreements. Apart from this in-
stitutional reason, economic theory provides several explanations why it may be
rational for employers and workers not to adjust wages to changing economic
conditions. For instance, new empirical evidence for Germany suggests that the
presence of implicit contracts and the concern to retain their investments in human
capital prevent employers from downward adjustments of wages (FRANZ and
PFEIFFER, 2001). 
The advantages and disadvantages of employing atypical labour rather than us-
ing other quantitative adjustment instruments depend on economic and institu-
tional factors. Alternative instruments of adjustment are, in particular, adapting the
number of employees or the number of working hours, or making use of invento-
ries. An economic factor which impacts on the choice of adjustment instruments is
whether the firm’s product can be kept on stock. In the service sector, for instance,
stock-keeping is often impossible, implying that other adjustment instruments, like
atypical employment, may need to be used. Institutional reasons may be employ-
ment protection legislation, collective agreements and works councils:
 Companies which are exempt from employment protection (such as small en-
terprises) will have a lower incentive to employ atypical labour, because their
costs of adjusting the number of regular employees are lower. 
 Since many collective wage agreements restrict the amount of overtime work
or fix overtime premia, companies which apply collective agreements may
have higher costs of changing working hours. They may also have greater dif-
ficulties adjusting the number of permanent employees, since collective wage
agreements often contain clauses regarding employment protection rules, in
particular clauses which protect specific groups of workers, such as senior em-
ployees (KAISER and PFEIFFER, 2000). They may thus have a higher probabil-
ity of using atypical labour. 
 Similarly, since works councils have to agree to the introduction of overtime,
companies with works councils may be prevented from using overtime as an
instrument of adjustment. In addition, works councils can increase the firing
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costs of permanent workers by increasing the procedural complexity in the
case of individual dismissals or of mass redundancies. Firms which have works
councils may thus exhibit a higher propensity to adjust with employing atypi-
cal workers.
 On the other hand, collective agreements and works councils may also provide
an obstacle for the employment of atypical workers. KAISER and PFEIFFER
(2000) argue that, since unions mobilise against the use of contract workers,
the likelihood of TWA and FL work is lower in firms which adhere to collec-
tive agreements. ABRAHAM (1988) gives a similar argument for the demand for
TWA workers in the United States. As for Germany, one might also presume
that the probability of using atypical workers is lower in firms with works
councils, since hiring of any kind of workers falls within the scope of co-
determination (see section 2). 
Firms will normally make use of more than one instrument of adjustment. In the
following, we will only consider the simultaneous adjustment in the number of
regular and atypical workers, leaving aside inventories and the adjustment of
working hours. We will assume that atypical and regular workers are distinguished
by the amount of hiring and firing costs. 
It is well-known from the theory of dynamic labour demand that, under certain
assumptions concerning the structure of adjustment costs, the nature of the shocks
and firms’ expectations, after experiencing a shock to the demand for their prod-
ucts firms do not instantly adjust the number of permanent employees to the level
which would be optimal in the long run. The first set of assumptions under which
a slow adjustment process is obtained consists of marginal costs of hiring or firing
increasing with the number of hirings or separations. A leading example is the
case of quadratic costs of adjustment. In this case, it is optimal to smooth the dy-
namic time path of employment over time, no matter how expectations are
formed. This result differs sharply from the one obtained by assuming linear ad-
justment costs where the firm adjusts instantly (NICKELL, 1986). Under the second
set of assumptions, expectations are static and adjustment costs are lumpy (i.e.,
costs of adjustment do not depend on the number of workers hired or fired). In this
case, the lag in employment adjustment is due to the time it takes the firm to real-
ise the transitory or permanent nature of the shock. Once the shock is perceived as
permanent, however, the firm instantly adjusts to the equilibrium level (HA-
MERMESH, 1993: 213ff.) .
If atypical and regular workers can be substituted, there is scope for the em-
ployment of atypical workers under both sets of assumptions even if their costs are
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higher in the long run than the costs of permanent employees.8 If, in the first case,
temporary workers have lower hiring and firing costs, employing atypical labour
is profitable for the firm during the process of adjustment to the long-run equilib-
rium number of permanent workers. In the second case, since atypical workers can
be shed more easily (by not renewing their contracts) if a positive shock turns out
to be transitory, the firm will choose to hire secondary workers first. If the firm
discovers that the positive shock is permanent, it can either replace atypical by
permanent workers or convert temporary employment contracts into permanent
ones. In both cases, atypical employment will be observed during the transition to
a new equilibrium. Analytically, the adjustment process is similar to the simulta-
neous adjustment of working hours and employment first considered in NADIRI
and ROSEN (1969).
The model presented by SAINT-PAUL (1991, 1996) is in a similar framework but
yields qualitatively different results. Regular workers are assumed to be associated
with linear firing costs. The adjustment of temporary workers does not generate
any costs at all. Firms are assumed to face stochastic i.i.d. demand shocks and
have rational expectations. In this model, the firm can be in two regimes. If de-
mand is high, the firm will employ regular and temporary workers. If it is low,
only permanent employees will be on the firm’s payroll. Since the firm expects a
positive shock to be reversed, it employs workers with low firing costs as a pre-
caution.9 As long as the positive shock prevails, however, the firm remains in the
dual regime. The empirical implication of the model is that it is the level of the
demand shock which matters for the employment of atypical work rather than
changes in demand conditions. Clearly, this pattern strongly depends on the as-
sumptions of i.i.d. shocks and linear adjustment costs, as well as on rational as
opposed to static expectations.
In all of these frameworks, an important assumption is that changing the number
of atypical workers causes the firm lower adjustment costs than in the case of
permanent workers. In reality, one would expect this to apply differently to differ-
ent types of atypical work. FTC and FL workers are likely to differ from perma-
nent workers with respect to firing costs at the time of contract expiry. By con-
trast, TWA workers (and perhaps also FL workers) will also differ with respect to
                                             
8 Higher labour costs for temporary workers are often thought to be caused by higher costs of su-
pervision. Additional reasons may be the profit margin of the temporary work agency or the
compensating differential for higher unemployment risk of atypical workers.
9 An interesting further result by SAINT-PAUL (1996) is that an increase in the volatility of demand
(i.e., the variance of the shocks) implies a substitution of primary by atypical workers.
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hiring costs, since the firm does not need to engage in search activities and some
of the bureaucratic costs of personnel recruitment can be avoided.
Furthermore, we have assumed so far that regular and atypical workers are sub-
stitutes in production, which is the case only if they have comparable skills.
Clearly, the notion that atypical workers are employed during an upswing and are
subsequently replaced by regular employees (if the shock is permanent) strongly
depends on this assumption. If both groups have different skill levels and are thus
complementary, the dynamic properties of the model are significantly altered.
Given that TWA and FTC workers tend to have lower skills (see section 3), only
firms with low skilled permanent workers can adjust their workforce by employ-
ing TWA and FTC workers easily. On the other hand, severance payments depend
on earnings, thus firing costs for permanent employees increase with the skill level
of workers. The same will also be true for hiring costs. If this aspect dominates,
the profitability of using atypical labour will rise with the average skill level of
employees in the firm. 
5 Data, model specification and estimation technique
Our empirical analysis is based on seven waves of the IAB-Establishment Panel
from 1993 until 1999 for West Germany which contains over 4000 usable inter-
views each year.10 The unit of observation of the data is not the company, but the
establishment. By ‘establishment’ we mean “the local unit in which the activities
of a company, that is, the production of goods or services, are actually carried
out.” (KÖLLING, 2000: 293). Since German dismissal protection requirements dif-
fer according to establishment (not company) size, this principle of data collection
is well suited for our analysis. The population of the panel consists of establish-
ments with at least one employee covered by social security. Therefore, estab-
lishments with no employees covered by social security are excluded, in particular
those establishments with only self-employed persons in the definition of the so-
cial security system (farmers, artists, publicists) as well as public sector offices
exclusively employing civil servants.
The IAB establishment panel is a stratified random sample of establishments.
Larger establishments have a far higher probability of being selected into the sam-
ple than smaller ones. In addition, the probability of being selected into the sample
                                             
10 Due to data confidentiality laws in Germany, it is not possible for researchers outside the Federal
Labour Service to access the data directly. For that reason, all data operations were carried out
with the help of the IAB-Establishment Panel Data Service at the Federal Labour Service Offices.
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differs across industries (KÖLLING 2000). In each year, the establishments taking
part in the survey are interviewed on the number and structure of their employees
as of June 30th. Except for 1995, the interviews contained questions regarding the
number of FTC workers; however, we can only use information for the years from
1996 to 1998 for the analysis of FTC work due to further data limitations. Infor-
mation on TWA and FL workers is available for the years from 1994 to 1998. We
restrict our descriptive and econometric analysis to establishments in West Ger-
many. Furthermore, we exclude non-profit organisations, the government sector,
public social security institutions and agricultural enterprises. Financial institu-
tions and insurance companies also have to be excluded, since they do not report
turnover as a measure for their business volume. 
Our objective is to estimate a reduced-form model of the use of FLC, TWA and
FL employment in West German establishments. Our dependent variables are the
dummies which indicate whether these types of labour are used by the establish-
ment. To test whether atypical work is used as an instrument of adjustment to
changing demand conditions, we use changes in turnover as a measure for product
demand. We also tried specifications with the level of turnover as an independent
variable in order to test the implication of SAINT-PAUL’s (1991, 1996) model.
However, this variable was found to be always insignificant, and hence we do not
report these results. Due to missing data, it is not feasible to subtract the material
inputs to obtain a measure for value added. Since we take first differences of turn-
over and control for unobserved heterogeneity in the regressions, we believe this
to be a minor issue. The turnover is deflated with the price index of net output
from national account data for different industries provided by the Federal Statis-
tical Office. As an alternative concept of demand shocks, we use a variable which
contains the management’s assessment of expected turnover change for the current
year (given by June 30th). Ex ante, it is unclear whether the expected or the actual
change of output explain the demand for atypical employment more accurately. 
From subjective assessments of the establishments’ management contained in
the 1993 and the 1996 survey we create a dummy variable indicating whether
there are seasonal fluctuations in the demand for the establishment’s product.11
This variable is used to check whether establishments subject to recurrent changes
in demand conditions rely more heavily on atypical work as an adjustment mecha-
nism, as the model of SAINT-PAUL (1996) suggests.
                                             
11 We also calculated the coefficient of variation of the output for every firm as an additional ex-
planatory variable, but results were far from being significant. 
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Apart from variables relating to demand changes, we need to control for a num-
ber of establishment characteristics. First, we included a set of firm size dummies
(defined along total employment) to control for the fact that the probability of us-
ing atypical work is higher if the workforce is greater. To control for the industrial
relations practices in the establishment, we use dummy variables indicating
whether the establishment is bound to an industry-level or a firm-level collective
wage agreement and whether a works council exists. 
Two further variables capture the effect of the technology used in the establish-
ment on the probability of employing atypical work. In line with the “skill-biased
technological change”-hypothesis (BERMAN et al. 1994), one might argue that the
probability of employing FTC and TWA workers declines with the production
technology used because FTC and TWA workers are less skilled on average than
permanent workers. Furthermore, new technologies often require further training.
Since employers’ and employees’ incentives to engage in job-specific training in-
crease with the expected duration of the employment contract, a firm will not hire
secondary workers for tasks linked with new technologies. One would, therefore,
expect the probability of employing secondary workers to decline with the tech-
nological level of the production technology (MAURIN, 2000). On the other hand,
SEGAL and SULLIVAN (1997) stress that the trend toward open standards, such as
those that allow for different kinds of computer hardware and software to be used
together, leads organisations to avoid solutions that are highly firm-specific. As a
measure for capital input and technological change we use firms’ own assessment
of the state of their capital stock in the previous year. Alternatively, we include the
volume of investments. We also use indicators for the kinds of investments un-
dertaken. One dummy variable indicates investment into information and commu-
nication technologies (ICT), another stands for “other investments”, mainly in-
vestment into real estate and office and traffic equipment.
Among the characteristics of the workforce included is the share of skilled work-
ers in the total number of employees, where skilled manual workers and white-
collar workers with vocational training are aggregated into the skilled category.
The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is theoretically ambiguous
(see section 4). We also use the share of women in the workforce.
In the IAB survey, establishments are asked whether they expect problems with
the workforce to arise due to sickness or maternity leave within the next two
years. We create two dummies accordingly and add them as a further explanatory
variable. Illness or other unexpected absences of employees (due to child care etc.)
are often cited as a reason for employing TWA workers (VOSSWINKEL, 1995), and
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they are also legally accepted reasons for employing FTC workers in Germany
(see section 2). In a theoretical model, ABRAHAM (1988) formalizes the notion
that the stochastic absence time from work is a reason both for overstaffing and
employing TWA workers.
As mentioned in section 2, exogenous variation of  the minimum employment
threshold level for the application of the Protection against Dismissal Law in Oc-
tober 1996 may be used to evaluate the effect of institutional firing costs for regu-
lar workers on the use of atypical employees. We expect that after October 1996,
firms with 6 to 10 employees use atypical employment with a lower probability
than before that date. To check for this effect, we use interaction terms of firm size
and period dummies. To obtain a comparison group, we do the same for the firm
size with 1-5 employees and the firm size with 11-19 employees. Our method of
evaluation is thus the “difference-in-difference” principle (MEYER 1995). A Wald
test is used to check whether the differences are significant.   
Descriptive statistics for all the variables used can be found in tables A5 and A6
of the appendix. Note that the means of the dummy variables give unweighted
proportions of the establishments in the dataset, as opposed to the descriptive
measures presented in section 3. The panel character of the data allows us also to
control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. To this purpose, we use the
random effects probit model of BUTLER and MOFFIT (1982). One possibility of
evaluating the relevance of firm-specific heterogeneity is to calculate the propor-
tion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component. If the
null hypothesis that the proportion of panel-level variance,  , equals zero is not
rejected, there is no difference between a pooled probit and a random-effects pro-
bit estimator (GREENE, 2000). A potential drawback of the random effects probit
model is that it is calculated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature as an approximation
for the high-dimension integral that is part of the likelihood function. This requires
the integrated function to be well-approximated by a polynomial. The approxima-
tion is appropriate if changing the number of quadrature points does not affect the
results. Our findings seem to be robust concerning the quadrature points. There-
fore, we conclude that the Gauss-Hermite quadrature is appropriate in our case
and the random-effects probit is applicable.
6 Estimation results
We estimate two different specifications according to the measure of output
change employed, i.e. either actual or expected changes in turnover. The results
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are contained in tables 3 to 5. While the actual output change explains the use of
FTC more accurately, the demand for TWA and FL work seems to be better ex-
plained by expected changes. Next, likelihood ratio tests are used to find out
whether the estimation of separate coefficients for positive and negative demand
changes (the unrestricted model) or a common coefficient for demand changes
(the restricted model) is appropriate. Only in the case of FL workers does the like-
lihood-ratio test indicate that the unrestricted model should be preferred: positive
output changes have a significantly positive effect whereas negative output
changes have no effect. Due to limitations of space, we only show the results from
the restricted model if this specification is not rejected and results from the unre-
stricted model otherwise.
The qualitative indicators for the state of capital stock as well as the sum of in-
vestment in the previous year were found to be insignificant in all specifications
(not included in the tables). By contrast, the dummy indicating ICT investment in
the previous year is significantly positive for all three kinds of atypical employ-
ment. Apart from reasons already referred to in section 5, this may be a confirma-
tion of the specialisation argument particularly in the case of contract workers: for
many smaller firms it will be profitable to contract out services provided with the
help of the establishment’s own ICT equipment. Furthermore, the highly signifi-
cant dummy for ICT investment may be based on supply-side-effects. In particu-
lar, it may indicate that workers qualified for ICT jobs are more flexible than
workers in other occupations. The dummy variable for other kinds of investments
is significant only for FL workers.
The existence of collective wage agreements has no effect on the probability of
using FTC or TWA workers. By contrast, collective wage agreements (in particu-
lar, those concluded at the industry level) have a significant negative effect on the
probability of employing FL workers. KAISER and PFEIFFER (2000) obtain a simi-
lar results for the German service sector. This may be explained by the fact that
FL workers are often covered by collective wage agreements. In establishments
which apply collective agreements, the cost advantage of freelance work may be
lower. 
The estimated coefficient for works councils is in line with our expectation. It
suggests that establishments with works councils tend to use FTCs more fre-
quently, because works councils increase firing costs for regular workers. How-
ever, works councils do not seem to influence the use of the other two types of
atypical work. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Employing FTC Workers, 1996 – 1998
Actual changes Expected changes
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err.
Actual output change 0.308 *** 0.118
Expected output change 0.299 0.188
Seasonal fluctuations 0.147 * 0.081 0.150 * 0.085
Collective wage: firm level 
                            industry level
–0.055
–0.055
0.130
0.100
–0.117
–0.158
0.141
0.106
Works council 0.524 *** 0.101 0.325 *** 0.107
Share of skilled 0.061 0.127 –0.039 0.133
Share of women 0.081 0.162 –0.225 0.169
ICT investment t-1 0.198 ** 0.091 0.200 *** 0.067
Other investments t-1 0.082 0.099 0.101 0.073
Problems due to maternity leave 0.354 *** 0.113 0.361 *** 0.124
Problems due to sickness –0.003 0.086 –0.017 0.091
Wave 1997 0.039 0.067 0.014 0.075
Wave 1998 0.350 *** 0.072 0.378 *** 0.082
Mining, electricity, water supply 0.697 *** 0.263 0.399 0.306
Basic industry 0.407 ** 0.162 0.619 *** 0.176
Investment goods industry 0.559 *** 0.147 0.783 *** 0.163
Consumer goods 0.294 * 0.160 0.406 ** 0.175
Wholesale, retail 0.254 * 0.154 0.420 ** 0.167
Transport, telecommunication 0.047 0.195 0.120 *** 0.210
Hotels, restaurants 0.624 *** 0.204 0.774 *** 0.213
Education, research, publication 0.657 ** 0.306 1.016 *** 0.331
Health services 0.692 *** 0.253 1.024 0.278
Business related services 0.308 0.190 0.342 * 0.206
Other services 0.107 0.266 0.245 0.262
Std. err. of random effects 0.907 *** 0.068 0.868 *** 0.088
Rho 0.452 *** 0.037 0.430 *** 0.050
LR-Tests for joint significance
Industry dummies 29.52 *** 0.002 43.07 *** 0.000
Wave dummies 28.3 *** 0.000 26.4 *** 0.000
Firm size dummies 334.86 *** 0.000 250.07 *** 0.000
Federal state dummies 29.18 *** 0.001 19.74 ** 0.030
Number of observations 4873 3735
Number of establishments 2285 2344
Notes: Firm size and federal state dummies are included but not reported. The results
are described in the text. ***,**,* variable or group of variables is significant at the 1,
5, 10 per cent level.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel waves 1 – 7 for West Germany.
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Table 4: Determinants of Employing TWA Workers 1994 – 1998
Actual changes Expected changes
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err.
Actual  output change 0.252 ** 0.124
Expected output change 0.457 *** 0.170
Seasonal fluctuations 0.017 0.089 –0.061 0.634
Collective wage: firm level 
                            industry level
–0.032
–0.082
0.161
0.134
–0.053
–0.074
0.305
0.524
Works council 0.127 0.135 0.214 0.147
Share of skilled 0.301 * 0.159 0.166 0.992
Share of women –1.138 *** 0.231 –1.226 *** 0.242
ICT investment t-1 0.328 *** 0.112 0.314 *** 0.114
Other investments t-1 0.162 0.120 0.156 0.121
Problems due to maternity leave –0.107 0.112 –0.252 ** 0.126
Problems due to sickness 0.106 0.081 0.059 0.503
Wave 1995 0.001 0.095 0.003 0.106
Wave 1996 –0.128 0.097 –0.049 0.112
Wave 1997 –0.001 0.098 0.131 0.113
Wave 1998 0.271 *** 0.102 0.432 *** 0.116
Mining, electricity, water supply –0.083 0.305 –0.053 0.343
Basic industry 0.802 *** 0.199 0.770 *** 0.214
Investment goods industry 0.961 *** 0.187 0.945 *** 0.201
Consumer goods 0.361 * 0.213 0.214 0.938
Wholesale, retail 0.075 0.217 0.018 0.230
Transport, telecommunication –0.382 0.290 –0.020 0.278
Hotels, restaurants –0.203 0.348 –0.467 0.381
Education, research, publication –0.009 0.456 0.025 0.440
Health services 0.381 0.352 0.620 0.378
Business related services 0.399 0.258 0.337 0.278
Other services –0.080 0.369 0.211 0.359
Std. err. of random effects 1.304 *** 0.070 1.286 *** 0.081
Rho 0.630 *** 0.025 0.623 *** 0.030
LR-Tests for joint significance
Industry dummies 75.15 *** 0.000 64.16 *** 0.000
Wave dummies 21.29 *** 0.000 27.66 *** 0.000
Firm size dummies 192.82 *** 0.000 155.99 *** 0.000
Federal state dummies 41.78 *** 0.000 29.88 *** 0.000
Number of observations 8680 7207
Number of establishments 2708 2843
Notes: Firm size and federal state dummies are included but not reported. The results
are described in the text. ***,**,* variable or group of variables is significant at the 1,
5, 10 per cent level.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel wave 1 – 7 for West Germany.
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Table 5: Determinants of Employing FL Workers 1994 – 1998
Actual changes Expected changes
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err.
Actual output increase 0,161 1.163
Actual output decrease –0,029 0,270
Expected output increase 0.558 *** 0.197
Expected output decrease 0.487 0.449
Seasonal fluctuations –0.020 0.080 –0.074 0.084
Collective wage: firm level 
                            industry level
–0.096
–0.425 ***
–0.712
0.112
–0.246
–0.543
*
***
0.139
0.115
Works council –0.055 0.129 –0.052 0.128
Share of skilled 0.504 *** 0.139 0.575 *** 0.145
Share of women –0.095 0.186 –0.213 0.187
ICT investment t-1 0.624 *** 0.102 0.621 *** 0.104
Other investments t-1 0.328 *** 0.110 0.326 *** 0.114
Problems due to maternity leave –0,058 0,105 –0.122 0.115
Problems due to sickness –0,153 * 0,083 –0.154 * 0.087
Wave 1995 –0,052 0,084 –0.029 0.091
Wave 1996 –0,148 * 0,088 –0.076 0.097
Wave 1997 0,035 0,087 0.015 0.099
Wave 1998 0,120 0,090 0.113 0.100
Mining, electricity, water supply –0.614 ** 0.294 –0.584 * 0.327
Basic industry –0.287 0.186 –0.317 * 0.192
Investment goods industry 0.120 0.165 0.143 0.171
Consumer goods –0.148 0.192 –0.110 0.198
Wholesale, retail –0.243 0.184 –0.154 0.188
Transport, telecommunication –0.409 0.252 –0.247 0.247
Hotels, restaurants –0.060 0.252 –0.123 0.257
Education, research, publication 1.342 *** 0.309 1.354 *** 0.292
Health services 0.062 0.280 0.309 0.282
Business related services 1.144 *** 0.199 1.033 *** 0.206
Other services 0.482 * 0.279 0.148 0.294
Std. err. of random effects 1.239 *** 0.071 1.154 *** 0.076
Rho 0.605 *** 0.028 0.567 *** 0.032
LR-Tests for joint significance
Industry dummies 101.80 *** 0.000 87.73 *** 0.000
Wave dummies 10.05 ** 0.040 4.160 0.385
Firm size dummies 155.82 *** 0.000 131.00 *** 0.000
Federal state dummies 21.35 ** 0.011 17.42 ** 0.045
Number of observations 8016 6303
Number of establishments 2825 2928
Notes: Firm size and federal state dummies are included but not reported. The results
are described in the text. ***,**,* variable or group of variables is significant at the 1,
5, 10 percent level.
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The probability of employing TWA workers declines with the share of women
employed by the establishment. By contrast, the share of female employees has no
effect on employing FL or FTC workers. The share of skilled employees has a
positive effect on the probability of using FL workers. This may illustrate the tasks
performed by FL workers. In addition, it may reflect the fact that adjustment costs
for skilled (permanent) workers are higher in general than for unskilled (perma-
nent) workers. Ceteris paribus, an increase in adjustment costs for permanent
workers raises the probability of using temporary workers if both are substitutes in
production. The effect of the indicator variable for problems with maternity leave
is highly significant in the case of FTC workers while it is insignificant for FL
workers and actually significantly negative for TWA workers. This may be due to
the fact that FTC workers are employed more frequently if the absences are pre-
dictable, which may be the case with maternity leave. 
The hypothesis that the service sector employs atypical workers with a higher
probability due to limited possibilities of using inventories seems to be rejected in
tables 3 and 4. As our descriptive tables already indicated, the highest probability
of using TWA employment is found among establishments in the basic and in-
vestment goods industry.12 By contrast, support for the hypothesis is found for FL
workers whose probability of employment is highest in the business-related serv-
ice sector. Furthermore, they are frequently used in the education, research and
publication sector.  
Another interesting result are the significant differences between the federal state
dummies. In city states like (West-) Berlin and Hamburg, establishments employ
TWA workers with a significant higher probability than in the base category
(Bavaria), which is a territorial state (the dummy variables for the states are omit-
ted in the tables due to limitations of space). This may again reflect supply restric-
tions. It seems plausible that the density of temporary work agencies increases
with urbanity. An exception is Bremen which does not have significantly more
establishments employing secondary workers than Bavaria. Similar results are not
found for FL and FTC employment.
Table 6 contains the effects of the increase in the minimum employment thres-
hold level for the Protection against Dismissal Law in October 1996 on the prob-
ability of using atypical work. Theses effects are estimated by interactive terms
between the firm size dummies and a dummy for the post-1996 panel waves. The
table reports the coefficients of the interaction terms. Otherwise, the specifications
used are the same as our preferred specifications in tables 3 to 5. 
                                             
12 The construction industry was chosen as the base category for the industry dummies.
25
The probability of using TWA workers decreased in all three firm size groups,
but the effects are not significant. In the case of FL employment, the probability
decreased only in establishments with 6-10 employees, which conforms with our
expectation. However, the effects are not significant. Most interesting is the result
for the probability of using FTC workers: The increase to 11 employees in the
minimum employment threshold of the Protection Against Dismissal Law lowered
the probability of using FTC workers for establishments with between 6 and up to
10 employees, while there are no significant changes in the two contiguous firm
size groups. This may be regarded as evidence for firing costs to be a more im-
portant reason for using FTC workers than using TWA or FL workers. However,
it should be taken into account that our endogenous variable is binary. If we
looked at the level of atypical employment in establishments, we would perhaps
obtain similar results for TWA and FL employees.  
Table 6: Effects of the increase in the minimum employment threshold level for the Protection
Against Dismissal Law in October 1996
Differences in the coefficients of firm-size dummies according to periods
(up to 1996 and 1997-98)
FTC TWA FL
Number of
employees
Differ-
ences
Wald test
(p-value)
Differences Wald test
(p-value)
Differ-
ences
Wald test
(p-value)
1–5 employees + 0.274 0.463 –0.722 0.173 + 0.256 0.292
6–10 employees – 0.518** 0.050 –0.068 0.599 – 0.367 0.202
11–19 employees – 0.178  0.432 –0.188 0.130 + 0.113 0.667
7 Conclusions
Our results show that the probability of using atypical employment is influenced
by changes in product demand. We conclude that this is evidence in favour of the
validity of the notion that flexible labour is used as a means of adjustment during
periods of transition to an equilibrium with higher employment. 
Collective wage agreements as one possible source of firing costs (due to addi-
tional dismissal regulations in favour of employees) do not influence the probabil-
ity of employing FTC and TCA workers. The use of FL workers is even less prob-
able if the establishment is subject to a collective wage agreement. This may be
explained by the fact that collective wage agreements can be applied to FL work-
ers. In this case the advantage of using FL instead of regular workers may be
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smaller. Works councils can also raise firing costs in Germany. In accordance with
this hypothesis, the probability of employing FTC workers is influenced positively
by the existence of a works council. 
The effect of investments in information and communication technologies on the
use of atypical employment is significantly positive in all estimations. This result
can be given different interpretations. First, the trend toward standards such as
computer hardware or software standards leads to organisations avoiding highly
firm-specific solutions. Second, for many smaller firms it will be profitable to
contract out services belonging to its own ICT-equipment. Third, firms use atypi-
cal employment in case of skill-shortage in this area.   
Another commonly cited reason for using atypical employment are temporary
absences of regular employees due to illness, holidays or maternity leave. Our es-
timations show that problems due to maternity leave increase the probability of
using FTC workers. Similar results are not found for problems due to sickness. 
The probability of employing TWA workers declines with the share of women in
the establishment, which can be explained by the fact that the majority of TWA
workers are men. The share of women has no effect on employing FL or FTC
workers. The share of skilled employees has no negative effect and in the case of
FL worker even a positive effect. This contradicts the view that atypical workers
are used only for simple tasks. In addition, it can be explained by the positive cor-
relation between adjustment costs and skill level of permanent employees. The
hypothesis that the service sector employs atypical workers with a higher prob-
ability due to limited possibilities of using inventories seems only to be true in the
case of FL workers. 
Most importantly, by using a change in dismissal protection legislation as a
“natural experiment”, we find evidence that the stringency of dismissal protection
for permanent workers has a positive effect on the probability of using FTC work-
ers. This indicates that firms do indeed use atypical work as a more flexible alter-
native to permanent employment.
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Appendix
Table A1: Duration of FTCs in West Germany in 1997 (cumulated percentages)
Months All Age < 25 Age > 50 Probationary
period
No vocational
qualification
Vocational
qualification
  2 6.9 6.2 9.2 11.0 7.0 7.2
  4 16.0 16.4 15.6 21.3 16.6 15.4
  6 35.4 42.4 29.4 37.7 37.5 32.2
  8 40.2 46.6 34.4 42.0 42.8 36.3
  10 44.0 50.5 37.3 45.2 47.0 39.0
  12 68.5 76.3 61.4 67.8 71.7 63.2
  18 76.7 84.5 67.3 74.4 80.2 71.3
  24 84.8 90.5 75.0 81.6 87.4 81.0
  36 90.1 95.0 79.4 90.7 91.9 87.4
  37 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Public sector and employees in vocational training are excluded. The column “voca-
tional qualification” includes college and university degrees as well as persons with A-levels
but without vocational training.  
Source: German Microcensus 1997.
Table A2: New and Terminated Employment Relationships with TWAs in Germany
(thousands and percentages) 
Year Stock of
TWA
employment
Terminated employment relationships
with a duration of employment of
total less than 1
week
1 week up to
3 months
3 months
and more
1992 140.6 276.9 8.9 54.6 36.6
1993 121.4 235.1 9.9 54.0 36.2
1994 138.5 274.1 11.9 56.6 31.5
1995 176.2 329.1 11.0 54.3 34.6
1996 177.9 315.2 11.1 52.7 36.3
1997 212.7 373.9 11.3 52.8 35.9
1998 252.9 482.4 12.0 52.3 35.7
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2000).
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Table A3: Share of Establishments Employing Atypical Workers by Number of Em-
ployees and Industry  (percentages)
FTC workers
1996-1998
TWA workers
1994-1998
FL workers
1994-1998
Number of employees
1-5 2.4 0.9 3.4
6-10 6.8 1.5 3.8
11-19 11.9 1.8 5.2
20-49 24.0 5.3 8.3
50-99 36.6 11.2 11.4
100-199 56.6 24.9 11.7
200-499 69.8 30.2 17.2
500-999 80.0 31.6 21.3
1000-4999 80.0 43.1 25.0 
5000 and more *  49.1 24.1
Industry
Mining, electricity, water supply 24.0 7.2 2.7
Basic industry 12.8 8.6 3.4
Investment goods industry 11.0 5.5 3.9
Consumer goods 8.2 1.7 1.9
Construction 5.7 4.9 3.5
Wholesale, retail 7.4 1.1 2.5
Transport, telecommunication 9.9 1.4 3.6
Hotels, restaurants 8.9 0.5 0.8
Education, research, publication 6.9 * 14.8
Health services 7.4 0.4 2.7
Business related services 5.5 1.5 13.8
Other services 9.3 2.9 8.8
Total 7.6 2.0 4.4
Notes:  Weighted and extrapolated data for West Germany and the sample described in
the text. * inadequate number of observations
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel waves 2 – 6, West Germany only.
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Table A4: Instruments of Adjustment to Expected or Unexpected Demand Changes
During the Year in West Germany in 1996 (Percentages)
Kind of prevailing demand changes
Expected Unexpected
Inventories  12 12
Overtimes hours / extra-shifts 35 31
Shifting of holiday or free-time periods 43 37
Short-time working 2 5
Additional FTC workers 20 15
Additional TWA workers 3 6
Hiring / firing of staff 10 15
total 55 30
Notes: Weighted and extrapolated data for West Germany. 
Source:  IAB Establishment Panel wave 4 for West Germany.
Table A5: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample, Dependent Variables
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observa-
tions
TWA Workers overall 0.176 0.381 0.000 1.000 N 7207
(Dummy) between 0.342 I 2843
within 0.193 iT 2.731
FTC Workers overall 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 N 4873
(Dummy) between 0.444 I 2285
within 0.232
iT 2.277
FL Workers overall 0.114 0.317 0.000 1.000 N 6303
(Dummy) between 0.279 I 2928
within 0.185 iT 2.728
Notes: N is overall number of used observations, I is the number of establishments and iT  is the
average number an establishment is observed in this sample. The between data are generated by
calculating the means over time by establishment ix . The within data are defined as it ix x x  ,
where the overall mean x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall, between and within). 
Source:  IAB Establishment Panel waves 1 – 7 for West Germany.
32
Table A6: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample, Independent Variables
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Actual output change overall 0.031 0.261 -0.992 3.169
between 0.187
within 0.210
Expected output change overall 0.027 0.220 -1.000 5.000
between 0.218
within 0.121
Seasonal fluctuations overall 0.292 0.455 0.000 1.000
(Dummy) between 0.432
within 0.173
overall 0.693 0.461 0.000 1.000Collective wage agreement
industry level (Dummy) between 0.437
within 0.181
overall 0.093 0.291 0.000 1.000Collective wage agreement
firms level (Dummy) between 0.262
within 0.159
Works council (Dummy) overall 0.462 0.499 0.000 1.000
between 0.492
within 0,095
ICT-investment overall 0.521 0.500 0.000 1.000
(Dummy) between 0.421
within 0.303
Other Investments overall 0.258 0.437 0.000 1.000
(Dummy) between 0.343
within 0.304
Share of skilled overall 0.599 0.294 0.000 1.000
between 0.275
within 0.129
Share of women overall 0.348 0.286 0.000 1.000
between 0.284
within 0.062
overall 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000Problems due to maternity
leave (Dummy) between 0.253
within 0.171
Problems due to sickness overall 0.177 0.382 0.000 1.000
(Dummy) between 0.336
within 0.216
Notes: See previous table. All statistics are from the estimation sample of the regres-
sion for TWA workers (N = 7207). 
Source:  IAB Establishment Panel waves 1 – 7 for West Germany.
